It's been a few months, but Dan Ventress is back to continue this series.
***
My
apologies for the hiatus, but I had university work to do. Now that I have some
more free time available, I can continue the review of Hawking and Mlodinow’s The Grand Design. During said hiatus,
however, I did manage to go to the Unbelievable? 2012 conference in Clapham,
London here in the UK, where I got to see none other than John Lennox, but also
Canadian astrophysicist, Hugh Ross, both of whom were giving talks on the relationship
between religion and science and both of whom made mention of Hawking and his
and Mlodinow’s book, The Grand Design.
It is also fitting that we return to review the third chapter, given that it is
one of the centrepieces of the book, and yet is by far the worst piece of
sophistry I have ever read. In this chapter, Hawking and Mlodinow describe what
they refer to as ‘model-dependent realism.’ Whilst I will, of course, spend the
most amount of time deconstructing the laughably absurd ideas contained within
this notion, I will also devote some time to correcting the other profuse
errors contained within this chapter.
They
begin the third chapter with the ‘goldfish analogy.’ They note how a council in
Monza, Italy, banned its citizens from keeping goldfish in bowls because it
would present the fish with a distorted view of reality, and so would thus be
cruel. Hawking and Mlodinow question whether or not that would really be the
case:
“But how do we know we have the true,
undistorted view of reality? Might not we ourselves also be inside some big
goldfish bowl and have our vision distorted by an enormous lens? The goldfish’s
picture of reality is different from ours, but can we be sure it is less real?”
Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design,
p53.
Hawking
and Mlodinow use this as the pretext for their discussion on epistemology.
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that deals with knowledge, and aims to
address issues such as defining knowledge, detailing how knowledge is acquired,
and asking whether or not it is even possible to obtain knowledge. This is
incredibly ironic, as Hawking and Mlodinow have previously asserted that
philosophy is dead, but then, nobody accused them of being consistent.
Now,
you would expect for Hawking and Mlodinow to assert that science is the supreme
and ultimate arbiter of knowledge, a self-defeating epistemological system
known as ‘scientism,’ derived from the hopelessly defunct verificationism, and
logical positivism of the 1940s. Yet, strangely, they do not do this, despite
their misleading appeal to Copernicus, Galileo, and the Roman Catholic Church. They
literally assert that, hypothetically speaking, if goldfish were able to hold
scientific laws from their own distorted perspective that always held true, and
thus enabled them to make testable predictions about objects outside of the
fishbowl, then would have to admit that their view of reality was valid. In a
way, this is similar to scientism, except that whilst those who hold to
scientism maintain that there is an objective reality, and science is the only
thing that can establish fact, Hawking and Mlodinow appear here to be saying
that something is true if it is part of a successful model or theory.
This
example is flawed for so many reasons. First of all, again assuming along with
Hawking and Mlodinow that, in some hypothetical situation, goldfish were able
to formulate scientific hypotheses, how would the way goldfish see things
physically affect their theories of light? Let’s think about this: we as humans
KNOW that other animals, such as the goldfish, see things differently than us.
Even certain subsets of human see things differently, such as people who are
colour-blind and so on. The reason we know these things is precisely because of
our understanding of how the world works. Our knowledge is informed by
scientific knowledge on the anatomy of various biological life forms, and our
knowledge of how light acts physically. The only thing is different is the
perception of each individual species, and, indeed, even of unique individuals
within a species.
Perhaps
a better hypothetical example would be bats, since they are blind and thus
cannot see at all, instead using sonar navigation. Yet this still would not
lead to a multiplicity of views being equally valid. Hawking and Mlodinow would
no doubt assert that, because bats can’t detect light, then it is not real to
them (providing they can develop theories that are different to ours and do not
utilise light) but at the same time say light is real for us. This is simply
not the case whatsoever. This is the age-old dilemma of: if a tree falls in a
forest and nobody is there to hear it, does it make a sound? Something exists,
regardless of whether or not we can detect it. There could be an invisible
teapot orbiting Mars. Such a thing might be unknowable from a purely physical,
scientific standpoint, but has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not it
exists. Indeed, we can reasonably conclude that such a thing does not exist
based on our current knowledge. Again, we can’t be 100% sure, but then, nobody
requires 100% proof for anything. Those who assert otherwise are simply
deluded, fact, not opinion.
Hawking
and Mlodinow’s argument thus appears to be as follows:
1.
Something
can only be said to be real if it is part of a successful scientific model.
2.
There
can be multiple models explaining the same phenomenon that are equally
successful.
3.
Therefore,
these models are equally valid.
This
argument is predicated on the following (false) assumptions, however:
1.
Science
is the only means of acquiring knowledge.
2.
Truth
of a theory is measured by its success at explaining current phenomenon, and
predicting future phenomenon.
3.
Knowledge
requires 100% certainty.
If
we reject these three assumptions, then there is no reason whatsoever to buy
into Hawking and Mlodinow’s argument whatsoever. For example, Hawking and
Mlodinow think that two competing models are equally valid if they are both
successful models. However, why think truth is measured by success? This is
merely a form of epistemological pragmatism: something is true if it works for
me.
The
problem is that, if what they are saying is true, we have no reason to accept
it. Since they have not demonstrated the truth of their statements using the
scientific method, they have not demonstrated their statements are successful
in the sense they use the term, and have not demonstrated what they are saying
is true is 100% certain. Of course, they can’t do this, not only because it is
impossible, but also because they fallaciously conclude that, because said
things are impossible, then knowledge of such statements truth-values are
impossible. This is nothing but self-defeating epistemological suicide. Nothing
has any meaning whatsoever. You could interpret my words, all of which are clearly
defined in English, as meaning anything. Or you could randomly decide they have
no meaning. I could just string together any random assortment of non-sequiturs
I like, as it wouldn’t matter anymore.
Moving
on, let us look at more of the blunders Hawking and Mlodinow. In order to
illustrate two different models of reality, they describe geocentrism and
heliocentrism, which describe the movement of celestial bodies. The geocentric
model states that the earth is stationary, and that other planets go around it,
whereas the heliocentric model states that the earth, and the other planets go
around the sun. Now, before I get started critiquing various blunders they make
presenting the historical background of these ideas, I just want to say how
hilarious it is for Hawking and Mlodinow to use these examples as the basis for
talking about their ‘model-dependent realism.’ Are they seriously suggesting
that heliocentrism is no more or less real than geocentrism? We’ll come back to
more of this later.
The
whole manner in which they present the history of these ideas is simply
fallacious and factually incorrect. For instance, the authors make the
following remark:
“Despite Aristarchus’ heliocentric model,
these beliefs [geocentrism] had been
held by most educated Greeks since at least the time of Aristotle, who believed
for mystical reasons that the earth should be at the centre of the universe.”
– Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design,
p55
First
of all, and this is just a minor nitpick, it is implied that Aristarchus had a
fully fledged heliocentric model that was rejected in favour of Aristotle’s
ideas, eventually culminating in Ptolemy’s models and ideas as presented in The Almagest. This straightforward
account, if indeed Hawking and Mlodinow intended for their account to be taken
this way (and given their appalling historical knowledge I would not be
surprised if it were) is simply incorrect. First off, Aristotle preceded
Aristarchus by 70 years, and even died 10 years before Aristarchus was even
born. Secondly, the earliest forms of Greek geocentrism can be traced back at
least as far as Anaximander, almost 300 years prior to Aristotle. Secondly, we
have no way of knowing how complete Aristarchus’ model was, since his works are
lost, and the only reason we know of his heliocentric model is because it is
reference by Archimedes in his book The
Sand Reckoner.
Thirdly,
the ancients had no way of knowing whether or not which model was the correct
one. Aristarchus hypothesised that the stars were very far away, and that this
explained why there were no observable movement of the stars relative to each
other as the Earth went around the Sun, a phenomenon known as parallax. Since
stellar parallax is only detectable through telescopes, Aristarchus' prediction
was simply unprovable at the time, and since geocentrism was consistent with
planetary parallax, it was assumed to be the reason why no stellar parallax was
observed. Geocentrism was not held for “mystical” reasons whatsoever. That was
simply the limit of the science of their day. Hawking and Mlodinow argue that
such a model “feels natural,” thus implying that human intuition is either
flawed, or outright false. This is simply nothing more than a veiled well
poisoning, as well as a slippery slope fallacy. However, they manage to make
the blunder of outright asserting that the geocentric model was adopted by the
Catholic Church and held as official doctrine for 1400 years.
This
is simply outright false, and for many, many reasons. First of all, the Roman
Catholic Church did not even exist until 300 AD at the earliest. This was when
the Bishop of Rome began assuming to himself a role of superiority over the
other bishops, thus negating previous tradition as well as ignoring the Bible.
This was the beginning of a series of changes instigated by the Bishop of Rome,
eventually culminating with the Great Schism between the Churches who opposed
the changes made by Rome, and those who sided with them. Secondly, there was no
universal doctrine regarding the relation between the earth and the sun until
the Galileo affair. In other words, prior to Galileo, there was NO official
doctrine on the matter whatsoever. Since Hawking and Mlodinow argue that no
model is more or less real than the other, then it is rather puzzling why such
an example is even bought up at all. What is really going is that Hawking and
Mlodinow are simply trying to bash religion and philosophy.
Indeed,
their next move is to fallaciously bring up the case of Galileo as some kind of
proof that religion is inimical to science:
“Though the idea wasn’t new, its revival was
met with passionate resistance. The Copernican model was held to contradict the
Bible, which was interpreted as saying that the planets moved around the earth,
even though the Bible never clearly stated that. In fact, at the time the Bible
was written people believed the earth was flat. The Copernican model led to a
furious debate as to whether the earth was at test, culminating in Galileo’s
trial for heresy in 1633 for advocating the Copernican model, and for “thinking
that one may hold and defend as probable an opinion after it has been declared
and defined contrary to the Holy Scripture”. He was found guilty, confined to
house arrest for the rest of his life, and forced to recant. He is said to have
muttered under his breath “Eppur si muove”, “But still it moves”. In 1992 the
Roman Catholic Church finally acknowledged that it had been wrong to condemn
Galileo.” – Hawking and Mlodinow, The
Grand Design, p56
This
is so absolutely and unremittingly false that I scarcely know where to begin,
although I can at least comment that their errors here manage to be less than
most commenters on this matter.
Copernicanism
was not met with “passionate resistance” until the Galileo affair. Whatever
debate and opposition was stirred up prior to the Galileo affair was minimal
and amounted to nothing. There was no “furious debate” that culminated in
Galileo being tried for heresy. Rather, the furious debate, and Galileo’s subsequent
trial, was a result of Galileo’s publication Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. Galileo was
encourage by the Pope, who was Galileo’s supporter at the time, to write a book
whereby he featured the best arguments for and against both Geocentric and
Heliocentric models. However, what Galileo did was to produce a very one-sided
account whereby the Copernican scientist and the neutral observer sided against
the supporter of Geocentrism, a priest named Simplicio (which means ‘idiot’ or
‘simpleton.’) Worse, Galileo attributed some of the Pope’s own words to this
Simplicio character, which was tremendously insulting.
It
was for this that the Pope turned against Galileo and sent him to the
Inquisitors. Furthermore, Galileo’s own data was consistent with the Tychonic
system as well as Copernicanism. As for the Catholic Church overturning these
decisions, it overturned its rulings on the ban on teaching Heliocentrism in
1758. The prohibition of Galileo and Copernicus’ work was overturned in 1835. The
1992 statement was Pope John Paul II issuing a formal apology on behalf of the
entire Roman Catholic Church. Yet it had already overturned the decisions that
resulted from Galileo’s trial much earlier. As for the phrase “Eppur si muove” there is no evidence
that Galileo ever actually uttered it. To their credit, Hawking and Mlodinow
rightly note how the Bible is actually silent on the issue of planetary orbits.
Of course, they still try their hand at making subtle digs against religion by
implying that the Biblical authors believed that the world was flat. It was
believed that the world was flat during much of the Old Testament period,
however, not only is there is no evidence of such a doctrine within the
Biblical text, there is no clear indication whether or not the Ancient
Israelites even believed in a flat earth (not that it would have mattered if
they had done.)
Yet,
as aforementioned, Hawking and Mlodinow claim that neither geocentrism nor
heliocentrism can be said to be more real than the other. So, what is the point
of bringing up such examples? It seems as if it is little more than simply to
bash religion. On the one hand, there is no right and wrong, but on the other
hand, one answer is somehow better than the other… and religion and philosophy are
stupid, or something. It really is hard to tell what Hawking and Mlodinow are
getting at sometimes, since there rarely is ever any semblance of coherency in
their book. It is amazing the depths some people are willing to stoop to in
order to defame religion. That a scientist of Hawking’s calibre has to stoop to
defending anti-realism solely in order to call religion names speaks volumes.
As William Lane Craig has said, bad arguments such as these are actually
backhanded compliments for theism. Theism is just so plausible, coherent, and
well evidenced that any argument for atheism has to be put forward, physics,
even the laws of logic themselves be damned.
However,
now we have slogged our way through that tedium, it is time to grapple with the
central “argument” of the chapter, and one of the key parts of the book. This
is where the nuttiness level goes from 10 to 11, and where the true ennui
begins. They flat out assert that either Copernicanism or geocentrism can be
used as a model of the universe, bringing up their goldfish example again. They
say that the “real advantage of the
Copernican system is simply that the equations of motion are much simpler in
the frame of reference in which the sun is at rest.” (Hawking and Mlodinow,
The Grand Design, p57.) They even
make allusions to the Matrix, asking how can we be sure if what we see is real
or a computer simulation. They stipulate that aliens could be in control of our
reality, and that even such aliens would also be unable to know if their
reality is more real than our own. Hawking and Mlodinow state: “This is the modern version of the idea that
we are all figments of someone else’s dream.” (Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, p57.)
They
call their view “model dependent realism.” The view that there is no picture or
theory independent conception of reality. They say that this is the lens with
which to interpret modern science through. They say that the traditional belief
that the external world is real and exists independently of observers, etc. is thus difficult to defend in
light of modern science. It pains me to read such sophistry, literally, and
figuratively. However, it gets worse if you can imagine. They claim that
certain principles of quantum mechanics have produced results that contradict
realism and even go so far as to suggest that our ‘four-dimensional world’
might just be a shadow of a larger five-dimensional space-time. They go on to
mention anti-realism, saying that it cannot be disproven, but we have no choice
to accept that is true.
When
it comes to going into more detail about their absurd philosophical claims,
they assert that: “Model-dependent
realism short-circuits all this argument and discussion between the realist and
anti-realist schools of thought. According to model-dependent realism, it is
pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with
observations.” (Hawking and Mlodinow, The
Grand Design, p61.) They say that if two models both agree with
observations, then we can’t say that one is more real than the other, and that
one is free to use whatever model is most convenient. This is excusable, they
argue, because this is how people behave in the real world. In real life,
people form models consciously and sub-consciously in order to interpret and
understand the external world, and so the same should apply in science.
Where
does one begin in dealing with such bizarre and logically disconnected
statements? I’ve had to stop half-way through Hawking and Mlodinow’s
description of their philosophical outlook here, because not only is it so long
and tedious, but there are just so many errors, I’m going to have to stop to
correct them now before continuing on. For starters, their claim that neither
heliocentrism nor geocentrism can be said to be more real than the other. I’ll
be blunt; heliocentrism is a fact. The scientific data we have confutes the
view that the Earth is stationary in the centre of the universe, with the other
celestial bodies revolving around it. This is one of the most basic of
astronomical facts. The real advantage of Copernicanism is not its simplicity,
but due to the fact it is the scientific model of the solar system that best
agrees with the data we have.
That
was the blatantly obvious and ridiculously easy to refute error. Now we shall
take a look at the confused mare’s nest of philosophical blunders and errors
Hawking and Mlodinow have made in those statements. Their appeals to the Matrix,
and other Solipsist type philosophies is nothing short of hilarious. Do they
seriously think there are no answers to such problems? Do they seriously think
these are plausibly true scenarios? Of course, given their earlier
pronouncement that philosophy is ‘dead,’ and these are all philosophical
statements, it is not hard to see why they think these issues are problematic.
It
is also not particularly hard to refute such notions that they bring up as
being problematic. For starters, how do we know that we exist? From the simple
fact that we are aware, that we are thinking, etc. The only response to the question of whether or not you exist
is: “who wants to know?” Secondly, we may recall the famous Cartesian maxim of cogito ergo sum. I think, therefore I am.
The very fact that I am even contemplating my existence is proof of my
existence. For if I did not exist, then who would be there to be doing the
doubting? Thus bringing us back to the previous answer of: “who wants to know?”
One’s own existence is probably the most concrete fact there is. Whilst it is
possible, however unlikely, that other people do not exist, I can be totally
sure that I exist. This is a philosophical issue, but, again, Hawking and
Mlodinow think philosophy is dead.
Whether
or not there exist other minds and other people is not so concretely
established, but is something that is once again relatively easy to show. Let
us consider Solipsism, the belief that there exists only one person, and
everybody else isn’t real. Needless to say all the various people who have been
Solipsists in the past all thought they were the ones who were real. Solipsism
is easy to refute on the basis that I am not a necessary being. As such, it
becomes inexplicable why I and I exist alone, and furthermore supposes the
existence of at least one other being, namely, the necessary being. The other
scenarios that Hawking and Mlodinow discuss can be similarly deconstructed, and
it goes without saying that I could have deconstructed the previous scenarios
in greater details, but I do not wish to ramble on longer than necessary. These
matters are important philosophical issues, and it just makes me laugh how
Hawking and Mlodinow throw their hands up as if these problems are
insurmountable.
The
main failing of their entire outlook, however, is the fact they think it is
okay to hold to whatever model one finds convenient, and that multiple models
can be accepted as true. Furthermore, according to Hawking and Mlodinow,
multiple models can be held to, providing they all agree with observational
data, even if they are mutually exclusive. This is simply fallacious, faulty
reasoning. An important and elementary point of basic logic is that two
contradictory statements cannot both be true simultaneously. Thus, a shape
cannot be square and not square at the same time, a man cannot be married and
be a bachelor at the same time, and so on. One could always deny the laws of
logic, but then nothing they said would have any meaning any more. Since
rational thought, mathematics, science, philosophy, etc. are all predicated upon the rules of logical inference. Without
logic, there can be no meaning, and so I could string together whatever random
collection of non-sequiturs I liked. Of course, if the laws of logic did not
hold, then we would be observing a much different universe, and the denial of
logic leads to impossible results.
With
that said, there are opposing models that are, currently, on equal footing from
an evidential point of view. Consider the various interpretations of the
special theory of relativity. On one interpretation, absolute simultaneity does
not exist, whereas on another interpretation, it does. On one interpretation,
four-dimensional space-time is to be interpreted as a tenselessly existing
block, whereas on another interpretation, space-time is tensed and three-dimensional,
with the fourth dimension representing time. In both cases, either
interpretation is on equal footing, yet there are still valid reasons for
preferring one to another. For example, the interpretation where relations of
absolute simultaneity are preserved and space-time is tensed and
three-dimensional is to be preferred since it is consistent with the A-theory
of time. The A-theory of time can be considered correct for other reasons, and
since there are valid interpretations of STR that imply the A-theory of time,
those interpretations are to be preferred.
Moving
on, the implication that, because people employ metaphysical pluralism on a
daily basis, metaphysical pluralism is somehow correct is more than simply
erroneous, it is absolutely and unremittingly false. If there is any one
uniform fact about human beings as a whole, is that the overwhelming majority are
monumentally and superlatively moronic. People regularly employ certain systems
of thought, modes of thinking, and employ homespun wisdom about common sense
that utterly and entirely antithetical to human reason. The horror stories
about encounters between the intelligent few and the unwashed hoards of human
stupidity are all over the internet. There are literally people who cannot
understand store deals, such as: buy one, get one half-price. This is simply a
bandwagon fallacy, plain and simple. The irony, though, is that most people
operate under the assumption that the external world is real.
Hawking
and Mlodinow’s rationale seems to be, because people operate under so many
different worldviews (or ‘models’ as they call them), then no worldview can be
said to be more real than the other. This is a particularly bizarre variation
of the old argument that, because there are so many different religions in the
world, they are all somehow false as a result. This is such bizarre, and faulty
logic that it truly strains credulity. How does the mere fact that many models
exist mean that none can be said to be more real than the other? This is simply
a non-sequitur that cannot be supported by any rules of logical inference.
Hawking
and Mlodinow continue:
“...what one means when one says “I see a chair”
is merely that one has used the light scattered by the chair to build a mental
image or model of the chair… another problem that model-dependent realism
solves, or at least avoids, is the meaning of existence. How do I know that a
table still exists if I go out of the room and can’t see it?... The model in
which the table stays put is much simpler and agrees with observation. That is
all one can ask.” – Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, 63, 64
Essentially,
Hawking and Mlodinow are trying to justify their anti-realist pluralism by
arguing that the reality we think we are seeing is really a virtual construct
produced by our brains not representative of true reality. The implication is
that, because we cannot trust our senses, we cannot trust scientific models as
being actually real. However, they then simultaneously claim that we can accept
the existence of the external world on the basis that it is ‘simpler.’
Hawking
and Mlodinow frame the discussion in terms of emphasising a difference between
observation and reality. Observation is merely the electrical signals
interpreted by our brains, whereas ‘reality’ is an almost ethereal metaphysical
plane we can ultimately gain no knowledge of. This is a yet another version of
the previous Solipsist style philosophies already mentioned. Instead of being
trapped inside a virtual reality, this scenario places us firmly within a
metaphysical reality that we call the ‘real world.’ However, despite being in
the real world, we have no real contact with it due to a perceived gulf between
it and our re-constructions of it. Because we do not perceive reality directly,
but rather, our brains process the information our sensory organs take it
before feeding it back to us, it is queried whether or not the brain, the
sensory organs, and the data we receive are accurate. We are thus limited to
the confines of our own mental constructs, reality blurred by our fixed,
restricted fields of vision.
Note
how Hawking and Mlodinow do not even pose an answer to the question at hand and
do not even address the matter directly. They merely assume that such a gulf
does exist, and that these things aren’t accurate. No arguments are discussed
or even aired at all. What reason is there for suggesting that the mental
construct produces by our brains from the data received from our sensory organs
provide us with an image radically different to what actually exists? Mere
unknowability is not a valid argument as it is simply an argument from
ignorance, whereas there are good, valid reasons for trusting our minds and
senses. When we see a chair, the belief that the chair is real and that we are
seeing what it really looks like is a properly basic belief. Stating that we
are building a mental image or model of an object based on light scattered off
of said object is merely a description of how we are able to see the object. As
such, this does not present an adequate defeater for our belief, and so our
properly basic belief is thus warranted.
The
main failing, however, is Hawking and Mlodinow are operating under the entirely
unwarranted assumption that one hundred percent accuracy is required to
establish fact. Because there is a degree of uncertainty, no matter how great
or small, they conclude that that is apparent grounds for complete and total
Cartesian scepticism. As far as I am aware, the only people who maintain the
illusion of total certainty are fundamentalists who, ironically, maintain the
same belief that total certainty is required to know something. Most people
have no problem accepting things as probably true or untrue based on
certainties lower than the one hundred percent. The only thing that could ever
be known with that level of accuracy is that one exists, for reasons already discussed.
Everything else is subject to at least some level of uncertainty, no matter how
minute.
Moving
on to the question of whether a table ceases to exist whilst I am out of the
room, Hawking and Mlodinow, despite maintaining that no model is more or less
real than another, still claim this question can be solved with their approach
by stating that the model which is simpler and agrees with observation is to be
preferred. This is simply a philosophical argument, albeit Hawking and Mlodinow
don’t actually give any arguments in favour of their position. They just make a
few bare assertions and expect their readers to accept it on blind faith. Indeed,
there are good philosophical reasons for accepting the model where tables and
other objects continue existing when we leave a room, because the model where
they cease existing is simply implausible. Hawking and Mlodinow are correct
that the model where objects continue to exist is simpler.
However,
simplicity is only one measure and cannot be used as the sole basis for
determining plausibility, although it is certainly useful. For example, for two
competing models, one model could be simpler than the other and yet still be
false. It is always important to have clearly-defined criteria when it comes to
testing hypotheses, especially philosophy and science. In this case, however,
there is just no evidence suggesting that the model where objects cease to
exist once you leave the room is more plausible. Other reasons for rejecting
the model where objects cease to exist is the principle that something cannot
come from nothing. As such, for any model where objects cease to exist when you
leave the room, there needs to be a mechanism or agent posited as the cause for
this. Since there is no plausible mechanism or agent posited, this is another
reasons for not accepting said model. However, the main reason for accepting
the model where objects continue existing is due to the fact that this belief
is based on the properly basic belief in the reality of the external world.
Of
course, to say that Model Dependent Realism “solves” this problem existence is
an absolute falsehood. It solves no problems whatsoever, raises dozens of
problems of its own, and is simply patently invalid. Hawking and Mlodinow
continue by discussing things readily held to exist, such as quarks, but cannot
be seen and state: “...according to
model-dependent realism, quarks exist in a model that agrees with our
observations of how subnuclear particles behave.” [Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, p66.] It thus seems as
if they believe that it is okay to treat quarks as real when dealing with the
aforementioned model, even if they are not actually real… or something. Again,
Hawking and Mlodinow aren’t exactly clear and concise in their language. Indeed,
it is unclear what quarks existing in a model even means. Do they mean that
they are treated as being real, or that hey actually exist? Does this occur
when the model is being discussed, or simultaneously real and unreal at the
same time? Whatever the answers are, it is clear that it devoid of any real
substance.
Hawking
and Mlodinow continue on to briefly discuss the matter of cosmological origins
and how ‘Model Dependent Realism’ allegedly offers a framework for questions in
this area:
“An early Christian philosopher, St.
Augustine (354-430), said that the answer was not that God was preparing hell
for people who ask such questions, but that time was a property of the world
that God created and that time did not exist before the creation, which he
believed had occurred not that long ago. This is one possible model, which is
favoured by those who maintain that the account given in Genesis is literally
true even though the world contains fossil and other evidence that makes it
much look older. (Were they put there to fool us?) One can also have a
different model, in which time continues back 13.7 billion years to the big
bang.” – Hawking and Mlodinow, The
Grand Design, p67-68.
This
really made me laugh out loud, and when you are wading through mind-numbing
tedium such as this, you need all the laughs you can get.
Firstly,
Augustine is not exactly an early Christian philosopher, given that he was born
after the first council of Nicaea in 325 AD. Generally, early Christianity is
defined as occurring between the death of Jesus and the first council of
Nicaea. Secondly, the line about God preparing hell seems to be a veiled well
poisoning fallacy judging by how it is phrased and where it occurs in the
sentence. It is hard to tell, since the same line appears in Hawking’s work, A Brief History of Time, albeit written
in a way that does not imply aforementioned well poisoning. Either way, this is
an incidental point. However, the remark about Augustine believing that
creation had occurred not too long ago most probably is, as is the rest of the
quoted paragraph.
The
third error that Hawking and Mlodinow commit is to make a blatant false
dichotomy, mixed in with veiled ad hominems. Hawking and Mlodinow present
belief in divine creation as being the exclusive preference young earth
creationists, and falsely claim that belief in a 13.8 billion year old universe
is a rival hypothesis to divine creation. This is an absolute and unremitting untruth.
Not only is belief that the universe was created by God not the exclusive
proviso of those who believe that the cosmos is a mere six thousands years old,
but the amount of people who believe God created the universe, whilst
simultaneously believing that the universe is 13.7-13.8 billion years old, is a
very sizeable number. William Lane Craig, Hugh Ross, and Kenneth Samples are
very prominent old earth creationists. Hugh Ross is himself an astrophysicist!
Did Hawking and Mlodinow seriously not know this? Or did they know and hope to
dupe unwitting readers into accepting this palpable falsehood?
Even
more laughable is how they try and paint Augustine, and others who hold to
belief in divine creation, as simple idiots. Even though there are Christians,
such as William Lane Craig, et al.,
who argue for divine creation on the basis of existing and well-established
data regarding the universe, such as the expansion of the universe and its
thermodynamic properties. Furthermore, in his work, On The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Augustine specifically states
that the interpretation of the creation story is difficult, and that Christians
should be willing to change their minds about it as new information is
discovered and presented. Despite believing that the world was younger than the
estimations of pagans, he maintained a fairly allegorical interpretation of
Genesis, and that the Bible does not mention the “course of the sun and the moon” because God willed to make us
Christians. He even goes as far as to call it shameful when Christians speak on
these matters ignorantly.
Lastly,
whilst not as widely accepted as big-bang cosmology, evolutionary biology is
not incompatible with belief in divine creation. There are many prominent
Christians who accept evolution, such as: Francis Collins, Alistair McGrath,
John Polkinghorne, and Kenneth Miller. The remark about fossils possibly being
placed to “test us,” whilst a valid critique of young earth creationism, is
simply an appeal to ridicule in the context in which it appears. Given that
this paragraph is purely an exercise in poisoning the well against theism,
however, I don’t really expect to see any decent arguments against any form of
theism.
Hawking
and Mlodinow next describe what they consider to be a good model. A model is a
good one, according to them, if it is elegant, contains few arbitrary or
adjustable elements, agrees with and explains all existing observations, and
makes detailed predictions about future observations that can disprove or
falsify the model if they are not borne out. This is actually not too
disagreeable. The only problem would be ‘elegance’ since it seems particularly
vacuous and poorly defined. Ironically, this is something Hawking and Mlodinow
agree with this assessment, but then state that all of their above criteria are
“obviously subjective.” [Hawking and Mlodinow,
The Grand Design, p69] However, since
the only example they give is, of course, the criteria of ‘elegance,’ it is
hard to see why.
They
also seem particularly incapable of even defining what exactly ‘elegance’ is.
Hawking and Mlodinow seem to imply a principle not too dissimilar from Ockham’s
Razor, yet it is hard to tell, given the vague, cryptic prose. What follows for
the next few pages is are the examples of how successful theories came to
replace unsuccessful theories, noting the example of how big bang cosmology
replaced the steady state theory. The second example, however, is the example
of an unsuccessful theory, Newton’s theory of light. Newton’s theory of light
could not describe the Newton’s ring phenomenon, whereas the wave theory of light
could. However, Hawking and Mlodinow note that in the 20th century,
Einstein showed how the same effect could also be described by the particle
theory of light.
In
a rather bizarre turn, Hawking and Mlodinow claim that this “duality” supports
their notion of ‘model-dependent realism.’
“Dualities like this – situations in which
two very different theories accurately describe the same phenomenon – are
consistent with model-dependent realism. Each theory can describe and explain
certain properties, and neither can be said to be better or more real than the
other.” – Hawking and Mlodinow, The
Grand Design, p76.
Not
only is this a complete non-sequitur, but, as we have already seen, this is
completely false. We have already seen how one theory can be preferred over
another despite both theories being equal from an evidential standpoint.
Hawking and Mlodinow continue unphased, and simply end by claiming that
M-theory, a network of theories they claim is good at describing phenomenon
with a certain range, whilst not a single unified theory is “acceptable within the framework of
model-dependent realism.” [Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, p77]
Throughout
the whole chapter, I was expecting them to conclude with a philosophical system
to test theories, yet not only do they not do this, they end with yet another
complete and utter non-sequitur. How has anything they said about
‘model-dependent realism’ led to this conclusion about M-theory? What even is
M-theory? They haven’t even provided a single example of ‘model-dependent
realism’ being a useful way of testing theories and now, all of a sudden, have
dropped M-theory on top of us out of nowhere. Even worse, they end the chapter
simply by briefly discussing the ‘alternative histories’ interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics, and simply barely assert that it has passed every
experimental test that it has been subject to.
This
is yet another falsehood. Quantum Mechanics has passed experimental tests.
However, the ‘alternative histories’ interpretation has not, since it is an
interpretation of the QM model, not a model itself. There are many
interpretations of QM, and they are ALL equal evidentially. This is simply
nothing more than a fallacy of equivocation. All throughout this chapter
Hawking and Mlodinow have made gross errors and a number of ludicrous claims
and remarks, some even making no coherent sense whatsoever. Even worse, large
sections of the chapter don’t even seem connected to the rest. My main
complaint about this entire chapter as a whole is that is tedious, cluttered,
and does not have a logical flow of argumentation.
After
finishing this chapter, I am not even sure what Hawking and Mlodinow are even
trying to argue, other than: M-theory is great, and the alternative histories
interpretation of Quantum Mechanics rules. Both of which are, of course, bare
assertions completely unsupported by the rest of the content of this chapter,
and not even connected to the subject content of the rest of the chapter. This
chapter simply has no real substance, and does not read coherently in any way
whatsoever.
